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Abstract—In this paper, we present a non-invasive reverse
engineering attack based on a novel approach that combines
functional and power analysis to recover finite state machines
from their synchronous sequential circuit implementations. The
proposed technique formulates the machine exploration and state
identification problem as a Boolean constraint satisfaction problem
and solves it using a SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) solver.
It uses power measurements to achieve fast convergence. Experi-
mental results using the LGSynth’91 benchmark suite show that
the satisfiability-based approach is several times faster compared
to existing techniques and can successfully recover 90%-100% of
the transitions of a target machine.
Index Terms—Black-box Analysis, Finite State Machines, Power
Analysis, Reverse Engineering, Satisfiability Checking
I. INTRODUCTION
Reverse engineering of an integrated circuit (IC) aims to
reconstruct a behavioral model of the design implemented in
the IC. Destructive reverse engineering is an expensive and
tedious process which leaves the IC under test unusable [1].
In recent years, non-destructive reverse engineering to recover
the functionality of a given IC has gained much interest [2].
Non-destructive techniques based on reconstructing the device
layer models of the IC by using hi-tech x-ray tomography
equipment have been proposed [3]–[5]. They require expensive,
sophisticated infrastructure and could be extremely time con-
suming. Certain black-box functional analysis techniques based
on characterizing the machine behavior using only input-output
observations have also been proposed. These usually perform
brute-force exploration [6]–[9]. They are relatively inexpensive
but focus on extremely small machines due to exponential
algorithmic complexity.
Power Analysis attacks are side-channel attacks which use
power consumption values to leak information from the devices.
These attacks are non-invasive in nature and use relatively inex-
pensive equipment [10]. By observing the power consumption
trace of a system with respect to a series of input vectors, it
is possible to guess the internal operations or the data being
processed.
With the explosive growth of IoT devices, smart cards and
other small electronic gadgets, it is essential to understand
various types of vulnerabilities. In this paper, we propose a non-
invasive reverse engineering attack against small-scale digital
systems. Using combined functional and power analysis, we
propose a method to recover finite state machines from their
synchronous sequential circuit implementations as shown in
Figure 1. Combining the two reduces the attack time and
memory requirements while increasing the scalability of the
attack.
Section II presents the groundwork. We introduce our pro-
posed satisfiability (SAT) solver based FSM recovery method
in Section III. Experimental results are presented in Section IV
and concluding remarks in Section V.
II. GROUNDWORK: HD-MODEL FROM POWER ANALYSIS
Let M = (I,O, S, δ, λ, s0) be a deterministic finite state
machine (FSM) or Moore machine, where I,O and S are finite
Fig. 1: Combined Functional and Power Analysis
non-empty sets of inputs, outputs and states respectively, δ :
I × S → S is a state transition function, λ : S → O is an
output function and s0 ∈ S is the start-state.
In sequential circuit implementations of FSMs, states are
encoded as Boolean vectors. Let B : S → (b1, b2, . . . bR)
denote a state encoding function where each state is mapped
to a Boolean vector of size R and is stored in a state register
with R flip-flops.
Let HD(B(si),B(sj)) denote the Hamming distance (HD)
between two Boolean vectors (B(si) and B(sj)) of the same
length. Circuit implementations in CMOS technology are sus-
ceptible to information leakage through power side channels
[10], [11]. The Hamming distance model assumes that dynamic
power dissipation in a sequential circuit implemented in CMOS
during its transition from state si to state sj is correlated to
HD(B(si),B(sj)). Given an unknown FSM, we are interested in
finding the Hamming distances of the transitions using power
analysis attacks in order to discover the state encodings.
First, we perform HD-model based power analysis on known
FSMs to derive a mapping between its transition Hamming
distances and the observed power values. This mapping is
then used to estimate transition HD values of unknown FSM
implementations using power side channel during a reverse
engineering attack.
Every FSM state register stores state encoding of the current
state of the FSM. During a transition, the contents of the
state register get updated which results in power consumption.
Hamming distance between these contents should be strongly
correlated to its power consumption value. In order to verify the
degree of dependency and generate a look-up table to deduce
the HD of unknown transitions, sample benchmark machines
of varying sizes and connectivity have been tested.
In order to deduce the relationship between the power values
and HD between states, for the SAED90nm CMOS technology,
a sample set of LGSynth’91 benchmark FSMs [12] of varying
sizes were tested for varying lengths of input sequences. Table
I shows the Pearson correlation between the HD values and
power measurements for 1000 random input vectors. A strong
correlation exists between all three statistical measurements of
current consumption during transitions and the HD values. In
this paper we use average current to infer Hamming distance of
transitions. Figure 2 shows the average current consumption of
1000 transitions and the corresponding Hamming distance for
TBK FSM from LGSynth’91 suite. The slight overlap between
average current values of consecutive Hamming distances in
the figure clearly indicates a possible error of ±1 during HD
inference from power analysis. It is also quite evident that all
0-HD transitions (self-loops) consume the least power and are
easily identifiable. These observations are key to justify the ±1
error in HD-inference and efficiently identify self-loops while
trying to reverse engineer the behavior of an unknown machine.
Benchmark TransitionSample Size
Pearson Correlation Coefficient
Average
Current
Maximum
Current
RMS
Current
DK15 1000 0.96795 0.92984 0.97055
BEECOUNT 1000 0.94014 0.93116 0.94269
BBSSE 1000 0.93645 0.89478 0.93203
TBK 1000 0.9444 0.95789 0.96032
TABLE I: Pearson Correlation Coefficient for Average, Maxi-
mum and RMS Current Values
Fig. 2: Average Current vs. HD Plot for TBK
The robustness of the power attack and the reliability of the
derived power models can be demonstrated as follows. Power
attack is performed on SSE benchmark FSM while treating it
as an ’unknown’ machine. The attacker can find out it has 7
inputs, 7 outputs and atleast 16 states; and is synthesized using
the SAED90nm technology. Testing the unknown machine with
500 randomized input sequences using HSPICE simulation,
average current values for all 500 transitions are stored. Table
II demonstrates the accuracy of Hamming distances inferred
using this power attack. It is observed that 426 transitions out
of 500 are inferred correctly and the rest are within the error
range ±1.
Error
(Inferred HD − Actual HD)
No. of
Transitions
Percent of
Total Transitions
0 426 85.20%
1 60 12.00%
-1 14 2.80%
2 0 0.00%
-2 0 0.00%
TABLE II: Inferred Accuracy of Power Attack on SSE Bench-
mark FSM
By performing similar attacks on a sample of benchmark
FSMs {dk15, beecount, bbsse, tbk} from LGSynth’91 suite,
Table III summarizes the findings in the form of a look-up table.
This table can now be used to perform a successful attack on
unknown machine and infer Hamming distances of its unknown
transitions based solely on its power consumption values.
Average Current (uA) Inferred Hamming Distance
<40 0
40 to 95 1 (±1)
95 to 140 2 (±1)
140 to 170 3 (±1)
170 to 205 4 (±1)
205 to 230 5 (±1)
>230 6 (±1)
TABLE III: Mapping Between Observed Average Current and
Inferred Hamming Distance of State Transitions in 90nm Tech-
nology
III. BOOLEAN CONSTRAINT BASED REVERSE
ENGINEERING ATTACK
To perform the attack, random input sequences are used
for machine traversal and the output sequences along with
the corresponding average power traces are captured. These
responses are converted into a set of Boolean constraints, which
can be solved using a satisfiability solver.
A. Constraint Formulation for Reverse Engineering
1) Power Analysis Constraints: Using the lookup table III,
the power trace can be mapped to HD inferences. Table II
demonstrated that the inferred HD values are within an error
margin of one, except for self-loop transitions whose 0-HD
values can be precisely identified. Therefore,
HDactual − 1 ≤ HDinferred ≤ HDactual + 1 (1)
2) Functional Analysis Constraints: Output function of the
Moore FSM depends on its current state. Therefore, for any
two transitions resulting in different outputs, it can be inferred
that their resulting states are distinct from one another. On the
other hand, identical outputs after transitions, do not necessarily
imply identical new states.
3) Boolean SAT Formulation: The problem of generating
a logically equivalent state machine can be expressed as a
Boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem. Let N input vectors be
applied to the target circuit, resulting in N output vectors and
N ranges of inferred Hamming distance values as per Equation
1:
O = {o0, o1, o2, ..., oN}
HD = {{hd1 ± 1}, {hd2 ± 1}, {hd3 ± 1}, ..., {hdN ± 1}}
To discover a binary encoding B : S → {b1, b2, ..., bR} of
bit-length R, we define a set of constraints on the encoding.
We define a predicate IdenticalStates for states s1 and s2 being
identical (in a self-loop transition) by requiring HD(s1, s2)
should be equal to zero:
IdenticalStates(s1, s2) :=
R∑
r=1
(B(s1)r
⊕
B(s2)r) = 0
(2)
Similarly, we define a predicate InferredHD based on Equa-
tion 1, where the Hamming distance of the transition lies within
a given range of observed Hamming distances:
InferredHD(s1, s2) :=
R∑
r=1
(B(s1)r
⊕
B(s2)r) ∈ [hdi ± 1]
(3)
Non-identical outputs within set O at the end of transitions
must imply distinct states. We define predicate DistinctStates
for states s1 and s2 by requiring the Hamming distance to be
a positive integer:
DistinctStates(s1, s2) :=
R∑
r=1
(B(s1)r
⊕
B(s2)r) ≥ 1 (4)
For a valid state machine which is logically equivalent to
the target machine, we need to find a state assignment with
an encoding of length R such that it satisfies all the above
constraints. In this research, we have used Z3 SMT Solver [13]
to solve for valid state assignment, since it is a highly efficient
solver which has the ability to generate models involving bit-
vectors and solve constraints based on them.
B. Algorithm for Reverse Engineering Attack
Algorithm 1 shows the process of instantiating and solving
the constraints (2), (3) and (4) while progressively increasing
R. The algorithm finds a valid state encoding for the smallest
value of R for which it exits.
The algorithm initially assumes that every transition results
in a new state. Therefore, for N random input vectors, N
transitions occur resulting in N + 1 states. The selection of
parameter N is determined based on the number of states
and input bits of the target machine (as explained later). As
equivalent states are recognized with the help of power analysis
and IdenticalStates constraint, the states are implicitly merged
or folded, i.e. the solver provides same encodings to these
states. Relations between the other states are also revealed
during power analysis which translate to InferredHD constraint.
Both these constraints are applied in lines (6-12), depending
on the inferred Hamming distances. In addition, functional
analysis reveals input-output behavior which helps determine
distinct states within the unknown machine. Lines (13-17) apply
DistinctStates constraint after comparing every transition in the
observed Output set. Upon finding a satisfiable solution, Lines
(18-20) print the solution, else Lines (21-23) increment R by
one. Rmin is determined by the number of unique output values
observed during application of the N vectors.
It should be noted that the encodings generated lead to
recovery of a state machine which is isomorphically equivalent
to the implemented one.
Selection of an appropriate number of N input vectors is
essential to ensure traversal of as many transitions as possible.
For a machine with X states and I primary inputs, if the total
number of transitions to be recovered is T , then T = X∗2I . The
size of the input vector set is selected to be at least double the
value of T so that the algorithm explores that many transitions
in one round, hence we choose N ≥ 2 ∗ T . It is still quite
likely that not all transitions would be explored. To cover the
missing transitions, the algorithm is repeated with a new set
of randomized input vectors to obtain a new state transition
graph. By identifying common transitions, based on the input,
state and change in output value, the two graphs can be merged
to find out new transitions that were not explored in previous
rounds. Since every subsequent round will fetch diminishing
returns, in our experimental implementation we terminate the
process when it recovers 90% of state transitions from the target
machine. Figure 3 shows the methodology of generating more
input vectors as needed.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
All experiments are performed using FSMs from
LGSynth’91 benchmark suite. The machines are translated
Algorithm 1 Generate Logically-equivalent FSM Encodings
Inputs: Inferred HDs HD & Outputs O obtained from applying
N random vectors
Output: Logically Equivalent State Machine Encodings
1: R = Rmin
2: while True do
3: initialize SMT Solver S
4: initialize State si, i ∈ [0, N ]: bit-vector of size R
5: set timeout = 1000000
6: for each hdi in HD do
7: if (hdi == 0) then
8: S ← Add ‘IdenticalStates’ Constraint
9: else
10: S ← Add ‘InferredHD’ Constraint
11: end if
12: end for
13: for each pair {oi,oj} in O do
14: if (oi 6= oj) then
15: S ← Add ‘DistinctStates’ Constraint
16: end if
17: end for
18: if (S is Satisfiable) then
19: print State Encoding Solution
20: exit
21: else
22: R = R + 1
23: end if
24: end while
to Moore machine style by changing the output function
while preserving the integrity of all state transitions, state
reachability and transition loops. Each FSM is converted to
Verilog RTL and synthesized with the Synopsys SAED90nm
cell library. The resulting gate level netlists are translated to
corresponding Spice netlists using a Verilog-to-Spice converter
for power and logic simulations. Power traces to perform
power analysis are obtained using Synopsys HSPICE and
NanoSim. The benchmark machines tested have upto 13 states
and 1600 transitions. The number of input bits range from 1
bit to 7 bits and output bits range from 1 bit to 9 bits [12].
The execution time of the Z3 solver depends on the size
of the machine and the number of test vectors. Due to the
randomized nature of stimulus selection, a given target machine
with the same test vector size will exhibit different runtimes
for every round. Hence, we report the average execution time
to compare the overall performance on different benchmarks.
Table IV summarizes the average run-times for different ma-
chines with a set of 100 and 1000 input vectors and Figure
4 shows the recovery percentage at the end of first iteration.
The brute-force recovery technique [8] based on input-output
analysis could recover machines with a single input bit and up
to 25 transitions in 1 minute, whereas technique [7] could take
several hours and lacks applicability due to the requirement of
terminating states. Our technique can handle machines that are
64x larger and also achieve much faster convergence.
Overall performance of the proposed algorithm depends
largely on the number of Z3 solver constraints and how
relaxed or tight a given set of constraints are. The following
contributing factors are worth noting:
Fig. 3: Stimuli Generation Methodology
FSM Average Runtime (s)Test Vectors=100 Test Vectors=1000
dk27 0.839 176.275
lion 0.259 0.884
shiftreg 0.623 45.652
train4 0.258 0.833
bbtas 0.854 146.489
modulo12 0.71 125.518
dk17 0.798 132.212
mc 0.675 39.61
ex5 0.823 601.05
lion9 0.653 132.242
ex3 0.801 102.515
ex7 0.526 74.304
train11 0.691 81.086
beecount 0.586 205.046
dk14 0.859 101.984
tav 0.771 70.926
s8 0.53 45.067
s27 0.565 40.344
ex6 1.027 657.988
bbara 0.86* 179.694
opus 0.83* 230.357
ex4 1.2* 301.787
s386 0.95* 462.514
*Equivalent machine not recovered due to limited exploration
TABLE IV: Average Execution Time for 90-100% Recovery
1) Self-loops: The solver will quickly generate a satisfiable
model for machines with large number of 0-HD transitions due
to its restricted search space. For example, benchmarks lion,
train4 s8 have more than 50% of their total transitions as self-
loops and converge faster than other machines of similar size.
2) Number of Primary Outputs and Output Function: The
cardinality of output alphabets for machines having fewer
primary outputs will naturally be small and hence, its output
function will map multiple states to the same output alphabet.
Fewer state pairs with dissimilar outputs lead to a smaller set of
state-output based constraints. Due to such relaxed constraints,
the solver will converge faster for such machines. This benefit
in speed, however, comes at the cost of suboptimal state folding.
Benchmarks train4, train11 and s27 have one primary output
and exhibit this behavior, whereas benchmark ex6 has 8 primary
outputs and takes the longest to converge.
3) Timeout Parameter: The proposed algorithm aims to
obtain a minimal length state encoding so the solver requires
Fig. 4: Recovery Percentage in One Round for Test Vector Size
100 and 1000
more time to converge with an increase in the number of bit
vector variables and constraints. For machines with over 35
states, Z3 fails to generate a minimal length encoding within a
reasonable time, but succeeds to produce a model having longer
encoding length. Non-minimal state encodings are undesirable
as state folding in that case will not be optimal and many
indistinguishable states will be misidentified as distinct.
V. CONCLUSION
This work proposed a novel approach of combined functional
and power analysis to efficiently discover a logically equivalent
state machine structure for a target sequential circuit implemen-
tation. The proposed technique is faster and scalable to handle
larger machines than existing methods. Recovery of 90%-100%
was achieved for all benchmark FSMs in under 11 minutes.
Future work on adaptive input vector generation to perform
guided exploration can uncover the remaining transitions for
complete recovery. REFERENCES
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